A select group of U.S.-listed companies faces unrealized losses exceeding 1.5 billion dollars in their Solana treasury, according to recent data provided by CoinGecko. This negative balance, derived from massive acquisitions carried out during 2025, has caused firms to completely stop accumulating this asset due to heavy pressure from global equity markets.
Companies such as Forward Industries and Sharps Technology concentrate most of these losses after acquiring more than 12 million SOL tokens. Although these losses remain on paper, their stock value has suffered a drastic devaluation, reflecting investor distrust toward financial balance sheets with such high exposure to the network’s inherent volatility.
Stagnation of institutional accumulation and collapse of equity value
Most of the asset accumulation occurred between July and October of last year, a period in which Forward Industries accumulated 6.9 million SOL at an average cost of 230 dollars. Trading currently near 84 dollars, the firm leads the losses with over 1 billion dollars, which has forced an indefinite pause in its corporate investment strategy.
Furthermore, Sharps Technology made a single 389 million dollar purchase near the market peak, seeing its investment shrink by more than 56% since then. Therefore, the ability of these companies to raise fresh capital has been severely limited, as their shares currently trade below the market value of their own digital holdings in custody.
On the other hand, the firm Solana Company, which built a position of 2.3 million tokens, has also ceased its purchases since last October. The importance of this milestone lies in the “treasury winter” that these firms are going through, whose shares have fallen between 59% and 73%, highlighting the risk of integrating crypto assets into corporate balance sheets without an adequate hedging strategy against prolonged pullbacks.
How will this institutional pause affect the liquidity of the Solana blockchain in the long term?
Because none of these companies have been forced to sell their assets yet, immediate selling pressure seems to be contained within operational limits for now. However, the equity market has already revalued these organizations negatively, treating their balance sheets as high-risk vehicles that depend exclusively on the recovery of the ecosystem’s native criptocurrency to survive.
Ultimately, Upexi’s case highlights the severity of the situation, with its shares falling more than 80% over the last six months of trading. This phenomenon suggests that traditional investors are penalizing excessive exposure, preferring companies with more stable cash flows and less dependency on the price action of highly volatile and speculative digital assets.
Looking ahead, the reactivation of institutional buying in the Solana treasury will depend on macroeconomic stabilization that restores confidence in the technology sector. Without a doubt, the gap between book losses and real liquidity will be the determining factor in defining whether these companies can maintain their positions or if they will be forced to capitulate soon.
